Corporate Debt Maturity Wall Statistics 2026
By Axis Intelligence Research
Co-author: Mia Scarlett, Business & Capital Markets | Last updated: September 2, 2026 | License: CC BY 4.0
The maturity wall did not shrink in 2026. It moved. S&P Global Ratings shifted the peak maturity year for speculative-grade nonfinancial corporate debt from 2028 in January, to 2029 in April, to 2031 in July — three years of deferral bought in six months of calendar time. Axis Intelligence Research measures that displacement at 6.00 months of deferral per elapsed month.
Quick Answer
The corporate debt maturity wall is the calendar of scheduled principal repayments that borrowers must refinance or retire. As of September 2, 2026, the peak maturity year for global speculative-grade nonfinancial corporate debt sits in 2031, pushed out from 2028 at the start of the year (S&P Global Ratings, July 28, 2026). U.S. nonfinancial corporate debt outstanding stood at $14.45 trillion at Q1 2026 (Federal Reserve Z.1). Refinancing that stock is not free: the 10-year Treasury averaged 1.17% across 2020–2021, the vintage now rolling, against 4.68% in August 2026 — a 3.51-percentage-point reset that Axis Intelligence Research prices at $35.12 billion of additional annual interest per $1 trillion refinanced, on the risk-free leg alone. The Axis Corporate Refinancing Pressure Index (CRPI) reads 56.42 at its September 2, 2026 baseline.
Key Findings
- Axis Intelligence Research finds that the peak speculative-grade maturity year moved out by 36 months over the six months from January to July 2026, a Maturity Wall Displacement Velocity of 6.00 — the market deferred its refinancing peak six times faster than time elapsed.
- Axis Intelligence Research finds that displacement accelerated within 2026: 4.00 months of deferral per calendar month between January and April, then 8.00 between April and July.
- Axis Intelligence Research calculates a 3.51-percentage-point rate reset gap between the 2020–2021 issuance vintage (10-year Treasury average 1.17%) and August 2026 (4.68%) — the August benchmark is 4.01 times the vintage average.
- Axis Intelligence Research estimates $35.12 billion in incremental annual interest for every $1 trillion of 2020–2021 vintage debt refinanced at August 2026 benchmark rates, before any credit spread is added.
- The Axis Corporate Refinancing Pressure Index reads 56.42 at baseline (September 2, 2026), with the rate reset component contributing 39.51 of that reading and the runway component 13.33.
What Is the Corporate Debt Maturity Wall, and Where Does It Sit in 2026?
A maturity wall is a concentration in the repayment calendar. Corporate debt is not amortized like a mortgage; bonds and term loans repay principal in a bullet at maturity, so a cluster of issuance in one year produces a cluster of repayments five, seven or ten years later. The wall matters because refinancing is not automatic — it requires an open primary market, a willing lender, and a coupon the borrower can carry.
The 2026 story is the year the wall walked away from the calendar. S&P Global Ratings moved the peak maturity year for global speculative-grade nonfinancial corporate debt three times in seven months.
Peak maturity year, by observation date
| Observation date | Peak maturity year for global speculative-grade nonfinancial debt | Months of deferral vs. prior reading | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| January 2026 | 2028 | — | S&P Global Ratings, Credit Market Research |
| April 2026 | 2029 | +12 | S&P Global Ratings, Credit Market Research |
| July 28, 2026 | 2031 | +24 | S&P Global Ratings, Credit Market Research |
The driver is on the record. S&P attributes the shift to a surge of new bond issuance in the first half of 2026, led by fundraising to support the buildout of AI and digital infrastructure, which lifted 2031 maturities while steady refinancing reduced speculative-grade maturities through 2029.
Mia Scarlett: Read the mechanism, not the relief. A maturity wall does not dissolve when a borrower refinances — the obligation is re-cut and re-dated at a new coupon. What moved between January and July was the date, not the principal. The 2031 hump exists because 2026 issuance created it. That is the same trade every distressed-exchange borrower makes, executed at investment-grade prices by issuers with genuine market access, and it should not be confused with deleveraging. Nobody paid anything down.
How Fast Is the Maturity Wall Moving? The Axis MWDV Metric
MWDV — Maturity Wall Displacement Velocity. An Axis Intelligence Research metric measuring how many months the peak maturity year moves per month of elapsed calendar time.
Formula:
MWDV = (months of shift in peak maturity year) ÷ (months elapsed between observations)
Inputs and computation, January to July 2026:
| Input | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Peak maturity year, January 2026 | 2028 | S&P Global Ratings |
| Peak maturity year, July 2026 | 2031 | S&P Global Ratings |
| Shift | 36 months | Axis-calculated |
| Elapsed time | 6 months | Axis-calculated |
| MWDV | 6.00 | Axis-calculated |
MWDV by sub-period
| Period | Peak year shift | Elapsed months | MWDV | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 2026 → Apr 2026 | 2028 → 2029 (12 months) | 3 | 4.00 | Axis Intelligence Research, from S&P Global Ratings observations |
| Apr 2026 → Jul 2026 | 2029 → 2031 (24 months) | 3 | 8.00 | Axis Intelligence Research, from S&P Global Ratings observations |
| Jan 2026 → Jul 2026 | 2028 → 2031 (36 months) | 6 | 6.00 | Axis Intelligence Research, from S&P Global Ratings observations |
A reading above 1.00 means the refinancing peak is receding faster than the calendar advances. A reading of 8.00 in the April–July window means that during a quarter in which three months passed, the market pushed its own repayment peak two full years further away.
MWDV is a deferral gauge, not a solvency gauge. High readings say the primary market is open and issuers are using it. They say nothing about whether the debt created to buy that time is serviceable at the new coupon — which is the question the next two sections answer.
What Does Refinancing Actually Cost Now? The 2020–2021 Vintage Reset
The debt clearing the calendar today was largely priced in a rate environment that no longer exists. The Federal Reserve’s H.15 Selected Interest Rates release puts the 10-year Treasury constant maturity at a monthly average of 0.89% across 2020 and 1.44% across 2021 — a 24-month vintage average of 1.17%. August 2026 printed 4.68%.
10-year Treasury constant maturity: the vintage and the reset
| Period | 10-year Treasury, average of monthly business-day averages | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Calendar 2020 | 0.89% | Federal Reserve Board, H.15 (series GS10) |
| Calendar 2021 | 1.44% | Federal Reserve Board, H.15 (series GS10) |
| 2020–2021 combined (24 months) | 1.17% | Axis Intelligence Research, from Federal Reserve H.15 |
| January 2026 | 4.21% | Federal Reserve Board, H.15 (series GS10) |
| July 2026 | 4.60% | Federal Reserve Board, H.15 (series GS10) |
| August 2026 | 4.68% | Federal Reserve Board, H.15 (series GS10) |
| Rate reset gap (Aug 2026 − 2020–21 average) | 3.51 pp | Axis Intelligence Research |
The Axis Vintage Reset Cost calculation, shown in full:
Rate reset gap = 4.68% − 1.17% = 3.51 percentage points
Incremental interest = 3.51% × $1,000 billion = $35.12 billion per year, per $1 trillion refinanced
Two things this figure is not. It is not a forecast of corporate interest expense, because it prices only the benchmark leg — a borrower also pays a credit spread, which moves independently. And it is not a claim that every dollar of the maturity wall was struck at the 2020–2021 average; that average is the vintage benchmark, not a coupon. Stated precisely: the risk-free component of refinancing cost has risen by $35.12 billion per year for every trillion dollars rolled. Any spread widening is additive to that floor.
Mia Scarlett: The benchmark is four times what it was — 4.01 times the 2020–2021 average, to the decimal. Treasurers who termed out at 2% in 2021 were rewarded twice: once on coupon, once on the deferral they bought. The ones refinancing now are paying for both. Watch the interest expense line rather than the debt line in the next four quarters of 10-Qs, because the stock of debt can be flat while the cost of carrying it steps up every time a low-coupon bond retires.
Is the U.S. Corporate Debt Stock Still Growing?
Yes, and modestly. The Federal Reserve’s Z.1 Financial Accounts put nonfinancial corporate business debt securities and loans at $14,453,810 million at Q1 2026, seasonally adjusted annual rate, against $13,813,363 million a year earlier — growth of 4.64%.
U.S. nonfinancial corporate debt outstanding
| Quarter | Debt securities and loans, liability ($ millions, SAAR) | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Q1 2025 | 13,813,363 | Federal Reserve Board, Z.1 Financial Accounts (series BCNSDODNS) |
| Q2 2025 | 13,937,228 | Federal Reserve Board, Z.1 Financial Accounts |
| Q3 2025 | 14,087,157 | Federal Reserve Board, Z.1 Financial Accounts |
| Q4 2025 | 14,141,492 | Federal Reserve Board, Z.1 Financial Accounts |
| Q1 2026 | 14,453,810 | Federal Reserve Board, Z.1 Financial Accounts |
| Year-over-year change | +4.64% | Axis Intelligence Research |
The bond market is where the deferral trade shows up most visibly. SIFMA reports U.S. corporate bonds outstanding of $11.7 trillion at Q1 2026, up 3.0% year over year, inside a total U.S. fixed income market of $50.5 trillion. Issuance through July 2026 reached $1,681.0 billion, up 26.9% year over year — the highest year-to-date growth rate of any figure in this dataset.
U.S. corporate bond market, 2026
| Metric | Value | Period | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate bonds outstanding | $11.7 trillion (+3.0% Y/Y) | Q1 2026 | SIFMA, US Corporate Bonds Statistics |
| Issuance, year to date | $1,681.0 billion (+26.9% Y/Y) | Through July 2026 | SIFMA, US Corporate Bonds Statistics |
| Implied prior-year comparable issuance | $1,324.67 billion | Through July 2025 | Axis Intelligence Research, derived from SIFMA growth rate |
| Implied year-over-year increase | $356.33 billion | Through July 2026 | Axis Intelligence Research |
| Average daily trading volume | $68.1 billion (+14.4% Y/Y) | Through July 2026 | SIFMA, US Corporate Bonds Statistics |
| Total U.S. fixed income outstanding | $50.5 trillion | Q1 2026 | SIFMA, Research Quarterly: Fixed Income – Outstanding |
Axis Intelligence Research declines one calculation here. SIFMA’s $11.7 trillion corporate bond figure covers financial and nonfinancial issuers; the Federal Reserve’s $14.45 trillion Z.1 series covers nonfinancial corporate business only, and includes loans as well as securities. Dividing one by the other produces a bond-share percentage that means nothing. The two figures are published side by side above and are not merged.
How Much of the Wall Is Being Cleared Each Year?
Refinancing capacity is measurable as throughput: how much of the outstanding stock the primary market absorbs in a given period.
Seven-month turnover = $1,681.0bn ÷ $11,700bn = 14.37% of outstanding
Annualized turnover = ($1,681.0bn × 12 ÷ 7) ÷ $11,700bn = 24.63% of outstanding
Annualized issuance = $2,881.7 billion
At that pace the U.S. corporate bond market is turning over roughly a quarter of its outstanding stock per year. That is the number behind S&P’s judgment that near-term maturities look increasingly manageable — and it is also the number that would have to fall for the 2031 hump to become a problem before 2031.
Mia Scarlett: Turnover of 24.63% is the whole argument for calm, and it is a conditional argument. It holds while spreads are tight and while the buyer of AI and digital infrastructure paper keeps showing up. Strip out one quarter of heavy issuance and the ratio drops fast. The honest framing is not “the wall is gone” — it is “the wall is being refinanced at a rate that currently exceeds the rate at which it arrives.” Those are different sentences with different failure modes.
Where Is the Refinancing Risk Actually Concentrated?
Not evenly. S&P Global Ratings flags maturities of debt rated ‘B-‘ and lower rising to $268.8 billion in 2028, much of it concentrated in the United States and in the healthcare, high technology, and media and entertainment sectors.
Lowest-rated maturity concentration
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Maturities rated ‘B-‘ and lower, 2028 | $268.8 billion (global) | S&P Global Ratings, July 28, 2026 |
| Geographic concentration | Much of it in the United States | S&P Global Ratings, July 28, 2026 |
| Sector concentration | Healthcare, high technology, media and entertainment | S&P Global Ratings, July 28, 2026 |
Axis Intelligence Research does not allocate the $268.8 billion between the United States and other regions. S&P characterizes the concentration qualitatively; converting “much of which” into a percentage would be manufacturing a figure that the source does not publish.
The Federal Reserve’s own read on where debt-servicing capacity is thinnest lines up with the ratings data. Its May 2026 Financial Stability Report, reflecting market conditions as of April 23, 2026, describes total business and household debt as a share of GDP continuing to trend down to levels not seen since the early 2000s, and notes that while some measures of leverage at publicly traded firms stayed high relative to their historical distributions, solid interest coverage ratios suggest those firms remain well positioned to service their debt. The exception is explicit: debt-servicing capacity was lower among some publicly traded non-investment-grade firms and riskier private firms, especially those relying on floating-rate debt such as leveraged loans and private credit.
That is the sentence that should shape how anyone reads a maturity wall chart. A bond maturity wall is a dated obligation, which is exactly why it can be pushed. Floating-rate leveraged loan and private credit exposure reprices continuously — there is no wall to push, because the repricing already happened.
Mia Scarlett: This is the split that headline maturity charts hide. Fixed-rate bond issuers bought time in 2026 and paid for it in coupon. Floating-rate borrowers had no such option; their cost of capital reset in 2022 and 2023 and never un-reset. When the Fed writes that servicing capacity is lower “especially” among floating-rate borrowers, it is describing a cohort for which the maturity wall was never the binding constraint. Model them separately or your chart will tell you the wrong thing.
The Axis Corporate Refinancing Pressure Index (CRPI)
CRPI — Corporate Refinancing Pressure Index. An Axis Intelligence Research composite scoring U.S. corporate refinancing pressure on a 0–100 scale, where higher readings indicate more pressure. Baseline reading: 56.42, as of September 2, 2026.
CRPI answers a question no single published series answers: given what refinancing now costs, how much runway borrowers have before the peak, and how freely the primary market is absorbing supply, how much pressure is the system under right now?
Formula:
CRPI = 100 × [ (0.45 × RR) + (0.35 × RW) + (0.20 × MA) ]
Components, inputs, and weights
| Component | What it captures | Raw input | Normalization | Normalized value | Weight | Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RR — Rate Reset | The coupon step-up faced when the 2020–2021 vintage rolls | 3.51 pp gap (10y UST Aug 2026 vs 2020–21 average) | ÷ 4.00 pp, capped at 1 | 0.8779 | 0.45 | 39.51 |
| RW — Runway Compression | How near the peak maturity year is | 52 months from snapshot to January 1, 2031 | 1 − (52 ÷ 84), floored at 0 | 0.3810 | 0.35 | 13.33 |
| MA — Market Access Tightness | How much of the bond stock the primary market absorbs annually | 24.63% annualized turnover | 1 − (0.2463 ÷ 0.30), floored at 0 | 0.1790 | 0.20 | 3.58 |
| CRPI | 56.42 |
Normalization anchors, stated so the reading is reproducible. The 4.00-percentage-point cap on RR represents a full reset from a near-zero benchmark to a mid-single-digit one; a gap at or above 4.00 pp scores 1.00. The 84-month (seven-year) horizon on RW reflects the outer edge of a standard corporate refinancing planning window; a peak seven or more years away scores 0.00. The 30% annual turnover anchor on MA is the throughput level at which the market clears its stock roughly every 3.3 years; turnover at or above 30% scores 0.00.
Reading the baseline. At 56.42, CRPI sits above the midpoint, and the composition is the finding. Nearly 70% of the reading comes from the rate reset component alone — pressure in September 2026 is a price problem, not a timing or access problem. Runway contributes 13.33 because the peak is 52 months out rather than 20. Market access contributes 3.58, the lowest of the three, because issuance is running hot.
What would move it. A 50-basis-point fall in the 10-year Treasury takes RR to 0.7529 and CRPI to 50.79. A quarter in which issuance drops far enough to pull annualized turnover to 15% takes MA to 0.50 and CRPI to 62.84. A downward revision of the peak maturity year from 2031 back to 2029 — the reverse of what happened between April and July — takes RW to 0.6667 and CRPI to 66.42. That last sensitivity is the one to watch, because it is the only component that has already moved twice this year.
Scope of the index. CRPI is built on U.S. bond-market and benchmark-rate inputs. It does not price credit spreads, does not cover floating-rate leveraged loan or private credit exposure, and does not weight by sector or rating band. Readings are published with an explicit as-of date and are not retroactively restated when inputs are revised; a revision produces a new dated reading.
Methodology
Collection. Every figure in this article was retrieved from a primary source during the production session on September 2, 2026, and every figure appears as a row in the accompanying CSV with source organization, source document, URL, and retrieval date.
Sources used: S&P Global Ratings Credit Market Research (peak maturity year observations and the 2028 lowest-rated maturity figure); the Federal Reserve Board’s H.15 Selected Interest Rates release, series GS10, retrieved via FRED (10-year Treasury constant maturity monthly averages, complete series 1953–August 2026); the Federal Reserve Board’s Z.1 Financial Accounts of the United States, series BCNSDODNS, retrieved via FRED (nonfinancial corporate business debt securities and loans); SIFMA US Corporate Bonds Statistics and Research Quarterly: Fixed Income – Outstanding (issuance, outstanding, trading volume); and the Federal Reserve Board’s Financial Stability Report, May 2026 (leverage, interest coverage, and the floating-rate cohort).
Arithmetic verification. Every computed figure was calculated twice in Python, once in floating point and once in exact rational arithmetic using fractions.Fraction, and the two results were required to agree to the published precision before the figure entered the prose.
Formulas disclosed in full.
MWDV = (months of peak-year shift) ÷ (months elapsed)
Reset = current 10y UST − mean(monthly 10y UST, Jan 2020 – Dec 2021)
Cost = Reset × principal refinanced
Turnover = (YTD issuance × 12 ÷ months elapsed) ÷ outstanding
CRPI = 100 × [0.45 × RR + 0.35 × RW + 0.20 × MA]
Precision from source. Where a source publishes one decimal place, this article publishes one decimal place. Where a source characterizes a concentration qualitatively — S&P’s “much of which is concentrated in the U.S.” — no percentage is manufactured.
Scope. Three boundaries apply. First, the S&P peak-maturity observations describe global speculative-grade nonfinancial debt; the rate-reset and turnover calculations are U.S. figures. They are presented as separate measurements and are not combined into a single ratio. Second, the vintage reset prices the benchmark leg only and excludes credit spreads, which move independently. Third, this dataset covers corporate debt. Commercial real estate maturities follow a different schedule, a different lender base, and different loan structures, and are outside the scope of this page.
Refusals recorded. Two calculations were available and were not performed: the SIFMA-to-Z.1 bond-share ratio (incompatible universes) and a U.S. allocation of S&P’s $268.8 billion 2028 figure (not published by the source).
About This Dataset
Contents. corporate-debt-maturity-wall-statistics.csv contains every numeric claim in this article as a machine-readable row: peak maturity year observations by date, MWDV readings by period, the complete 2020–2021 monthly 10-year Treasury vintage series, 2026 monthly benchmark readings, Z.1 quarterly corporate debt levels, SIFMA issuance and outstanding figures, all CRPI components with weights and normalization anchors, and every Axis-calculated figure with its formula recorded in method_note.
Temporal coverage. January 2020 – August 2026, with the CRPI baseline snapshot dated September 2, 2026.
Spatial coverage. United States, with global observations explicitly labeled.
License. Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). Free to use, share, and adapt with attribution.
Mirrors. Hugging Face, Kaggle, and GitHub.
Citation formats
APA: Axis Intelligence Research, & Scarlett, M. (2026, September 2). Corporate debt maturity wall statistics 2026: The refinancing schedule, the rate reset, and the Axis CRPI reading. Axis Intelligence. https://axis-intelligence.com/corporate-debt-maturity-wall-statistics/
MLA: Axis Intelligence Research, and Mia Scarlett. “Corporate Debt Maturity Wall Statistics 2026: The Refinancing Schedule, the Rate Reset, and the Axis CRPI Reading.” Axis Intelligence, 2 Sept. 2026, axis-intelligence.com/corporate-debt-maturity-wall-statistics/.
Chicago: Axis Intelligence Research and Mia Scarlett. “Corporate Debt Maturity Wall Statistics 2026: The Refinancing Schedule, the Rate Reset, and the Axis CRPI Reading.” Axis Intelligence, September 2, 2026. https://axis-intelligence.com/corporate-debt-maturity-wall-statistics/.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does a receding maturity peak mean corporate debt risk has fallen?
No. Deferral changes the date, not the principal. When the peak moves from 2028 to 2031, the obligations that would have come due in 2028 have been replaced by new obligations dated 2031, usually at a higher coupon. Axis Intelligence Research measures that movement at 6.00 months of deferral per elapsed month across the first seven months of 2026 — a measure of primary-market access, not of deleveraging.
Which maturity year should a credit analyst actually model in 2026?
Both 2028 and 2031, for different cohorts. The 2031 hump is where investment-grade and stronger speculative-grade issuers pushed their obligations using 2026 issuance. The 2028 concentration is where the weakest paper sits: S&P Global Ratings puts maturities rated ‘B-‘ and lower at $268.8 billion in 2028, clustered in healthcare, high technology, and media and entertainment. Averaging the two produces a chart that describes no real borrower.
How much does refinancing 2021-vintage debt cost today?
On the benchmark leg alone, 3.51 percentage points more. The 10-year Treasury averaged 1.17% across 2020–2021 and printed 4.68% in August 2026 — 4.01 times the vintage average. Axis Intelligence Research prices that at $35.12 billion of additional annual interest per $1 trillion refinanced, before any credit spread is added.
Why is AI and data center issuance showing up in a maturity wall analysis?
Because it is the mechanism that moved the wall. S&P Global Ratings attributes the shift in the peak maturity year to a surge of first-half 2026 bond issuance led by fundraising for AI and digital infrastructure buildouts, which lifted 2031 maturities. The financing structure of the AI buildout is now a direct input into the corporate refinancing calendar, not a separate sector story.
Do leveraged loans and private credit have a maturity wall?
Not in the same sense. Floating-rate instruments reprice continuously, so the cost shock arrives on a rate reset rather than at maturity. The Federal Reserve’s May 2026 Financial Stability Report identifies exactly this cohort — publicly traded non-investment-grade firms and riskier private firms relying on floating-rate debt such as leveraged loans and private credit — as having lower debt-servicing capacity, even while interest coverage ratios across public firms generally stayed solid.
What is the Axis CRPI and what does 56.42 mean?
The Corporate Refinancing Pressure Index is an Axis Intelligence Research composite scoring U.S. refinancing pressure from 0 to 100 across three sourced components: the rate reset gap (weight 0.45), runway to the peak maturity year (0.35), and primary-market turnover (0.20). The September 2, 2026 baseline of 56.42 is composed of 39.51 from the rate reset, 13.33 from runway, and 3.58 from market access. The composition is the point: today’s pressure is priced in coupons, not in calendar crunch or closed markets.
How much of the corporate bond market gets refinanced in a typical year right now?
Roughly a quarter of it. SIFMA reports $1,681.0 billion of U.S. corporate bond issuance through July 2026 against $11.7 trillion outstanding at Q1 2026. Axis Intelligence Research annualizes that to $2,881.7 billion, or 24.63% of the outstanding stock — the throughput rate that makes near-term maturities absorbable.
Where does the Federal Reserve publish the underlying corporate debt figure, and when does it update?
The Z.1 Financial Accounts of the United States, released quarterly. Nonfinancial corporate business debt securities and loans stood at $14,453,810 million at Q1 2026 on a seasonally adjusted annual rate basis, up 4.64% year over year. The next Z.1 release is scheduled for September 2026, which will add the Q2 2026 reading.
Is corporate leverage high by historical standards in 2026?
The Federal Reserve’s answer is layered. Its May 2026 Financial Stability Report records total business and household debt as a share of GDP continuing to trend down to levels not seen since the early 2000s, while some measures of leverage at publicly traded firms stayed high relative to their historical distributions. The reconciling variable is interest coverage, which the Board describes as solid for public firms generally — which is why the reset gap in this article is framed as a cost problem rather than a solvency one.
What would make the maturity wall dangerous again?
A fall in refinancing throughput before the peak arrives. The 2031 hump is 52 months out; at 24.63% annualized turnover the market can absorb a great deal in that window. CRPI’s market access component would rise from 0.1790 to 0.50 if annualized turnover fell to 15%, lifting the index from 56.42 to 62.84. Watch quarterly issuance against outstanding, not the shape of the maturity chart.